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We study the behavior of U.S. markets both before and after U.S. Federal Open Market Commission
meetings and show that the announcement of a U.S. Federal Reserve rate change causes a financial shock,
where the dynamics after the announcement is described by an analog of the Omori earthquake law. We
quantify the rate nt of aftershocks following an interest-rate change at time T and find power-law decay
which scales as nt−Tt−T−, with  positive. Surprisingly, we find that the same law describes the rate
nt−T of “preshocks” before the interest-rate change at time T. This study quantitatively relates the size of
the market response to the news which caused the shock and uncovers the presence of quantifiable preshocks.
We demonstrate that the news associated with interest-rate change is responsible for causing both the antici-
pation before the announcement and the surprise after the announcement. We estimate the magnitude of
financial news using the relative difference between the U.S. Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds effective rate.
Our results are consistent with the “sign effect,” in which “bad news” has a larger impact than “good news.”
Furthermore, we observe significant volatility aftershocks, confirming a “market under-reaction” that lasts at
least one trading day.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.81.066121 PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 91.30.Px, 89.75.Da, 64.60.av
I. INTRODUCTION
Interest-rate changes by the Federal Reserve provide a
significant perturbation to financial markets, which we ana-
lyze from the perspective of statistical physics 1–6. The
Federal Reserve Board Fed, in charge of monetary policy
as the central bank of the United States, is one of the most
influential financial institutions in the world. During Federal
Open Market Commission FOMC meetings, the Fed deter-
mines whether or not to change key interest rates. These
interest rates serve as a benchmark and a barometer for both
American and international economies. The publicly released
statements from the scheduled FOMC meetings provide
grounds for widespread speculation in financial markets, of-
ten with significant consequences.
In this paper, we show that markets respond sharply to
FOMC news in a complex way reminiscent of physical
earthquakes described by the Omori law 7,8. For financial
markets, the Omori law was first observed in market crashes
by Lillo and Mantegna 9, followed by a further study of
Weber et al. 10, which found the same behavior in
medium-sized aftershocks. However, the market crash is
only an extreme example of information flow in financial
markets. This paper extends the Omori law observed in large
financial crises to the more common Federal Reserve an-
nouncements and suggests that large market news dissipates
via power-law relaxation Omori law of the volatility. In
addition to the standard Omori dynamics following the an-
nouncement, we also find unique Omori dynamics before the
announcement.
The market dynamics following the release of FOMC
news are consistent with previous studies of price discovery
in foreign exchange markets following marcroeconomic
news releases 11,12. Furthermore, we hypothesize that the
uncertainty in Fed actions, coupled with the preannounced
schedule of FOMC meetings, can increase speculation
among market traders, which can lead to the observed mar-
ket under-reaction 13. Market under-reaction, meaning that
markets take a finite time to readjust prices following news,
is not consistent with the efficient market hypothesis; several
theories have been proposed to account for these phenomena
14.
We analyze all 66 scheduled FOMC meetings in the 8
year period of 2000–2008 using daily data from 15. Also,
for the 2 year period of 2001–2002, we analyze the intraday
behavior for 19 FOMC meetings using Trades and Quote
TAQ data on the 1 min time scale.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we describe
the FOMC meetings and the Fed interest rate relevant to our
analysis. In Sec. III A we analyze the response of the S&P
100, the top 100 stocks ranked by 12 month sales according
to a 2002 BusinessWeek report belonging to the 2002 S&P
500 index, over the 2000–2008 period using daily data. Us-
ing the relative spread between the 6 month Treasury Bill
and the Federal Funds effective rates, we relate the specula-
tion prior to the FOMC meetings to the daily market vola-
tility, measured here as the logarithmic difference between
the intraday high and low prices for a given stock on the day
of the announcement. In Sec. III B we study high-frequency
intraday TAQ data on the 1 min scale for the S&P 100 and
find an Omori law with positive exponent immediately fol-
lowing the announcement of Fed rate changes. Further, we
relate the intraday market response quantified by both the
Omori exponent and Omori amplitude to the change in mar-
ket expectations before and after the announcement.
II. FOMC MEETINGS, FED INTEREST RATES,
AND TREASURY BILLS
There are many economic indicators that determine the
health of the U.S. economy. In turn, the health of the U.S.
economy sets a global standard due to the ubiquity of both
PHYSICAL REVIEW E 81, 066121 2010
1539-3755/2010/816/06612111 ©2010 The American Physical Society066121-1
the U.S. Dollar and the economic presence maintained
through imports, exports, and the global market 16. The
U.S. Federal Reserve target rate, along with the effective
“overnight” rate, sets the scale for interest rates in the United
States and abroad. The target rate is determined at FOMC
meetings, which are scheduled throughout the year, with de-
tailed minutes publicly released from these meetings. The
effective rate is a “weighted average of rates on brokered
trades” between the Fed and large banks and financial insti-
tutions and is a market realization of the target rate 17. In
Fig. 1 we plot the federal interest rates over the 8 year period
of 2000–2008.
Our analysis focuses on the FOMC meetings after January
2000. Historically, the methods for releasing the meeting de-
tails have varied. In the 1990s, there was a transition from a
very secretive policy toward the current transparent policy
18. Since the year 2000, the Fed has released statements
detailing the views and goals of the FOMC. This increase in
public information has led to an era of mass speculation in
the markets, revolving mainly around key economic indica-
tors such as the unemployment rate, the consumer price in-
dex, the money supply, etc. These economic indicators also
influence the FOMC in their decision to either change or
maintain key interest rates. Speculation has assumed many
forms and new heights, evident in the implementation of new
types of derivatives based on federal securities. For instance,
options and futures are available at the Chicago Board of
Trade, which are based on Federal Funds, Treasury Bills, and
Euro-Dollar foreign exchange. These contracts can be used
to estimate the implied probability of interest-rate changes,
utilizing sophisticated methods focused on the price move-
ment of expiring derivative contracts 19–24.
In the next section, we outline a simple method to mea-
sure speculation prior to a scheduled FOMC meeting using
the 6 month Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds effective
overnight rate. These data are readily available and are up-
dated frequently at the website of the Federal Reserve 17.
Because each FOMC meeting is met with speculation in the
weeks before the meeting and anticipation in the hours be-
fore the announcement, we identify the decision to change
or not to change key interest rates as a market perturbation.
The market response results from the systematic stress asso-
ciated with the speculation and anticipation, which are not
always in line with the FOMC decision.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Response to FOMC meetings on daily time scale
In this section we analyze the daily activity before and
after 66 scheduled FOMC meetings over the 8 year period of
2000–2008, where scheduled meetings are publicly an-
nounced at least a year in advance 17. We do not consider
unscheduled meetings resulting in rate change, which con-
tain an intrinsic element of surprise and are historically in-
frequent only four unexpected target rate changes over the
same period. Of primary importance is the FOMC commit-
tee’s decision to change or not change the target rate Rt by
some percent Rt, where the absolute relative change
Rt /Rt−1 has typically filled the range between 0.0 and
0.25. This section serves as an initial motivation for the in-
traday analysis and will also serve as a guide in developing a
metric that captures market speculation. In this section we
use the intraday high-low price range to quantify the magni-
tude of price fluctuations. In particular, we analyze the com-
panies belonging to the S&P 100 and also the subset of 18
banking and finance companies referred to here as the
“bank” sector.
In Fig. 1a we plot Tt, the time series for the 6 month
Treasury Bill, along with Ft, the Federal Funds effective
rate, and Rt, the Federal Funds target rate, over the 8 year
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FIG. 1. Color online An illustration of the close relation be-
tween the Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds rate. a Time series
of the Federal Reserve Target rate Rt and the Federal Reserve
Effective rate Ft for Federal Funds dating from January 2000 to
April 2008. The 6 month Treasury Bill Tt closely follows the
effective rate, with speculation about future changes causing devia-
tions in the relative values. United States Treasury Bills carry little
risk and are considered to be one of the most secure investments.
b A typical illustration of the Federal Funds effective rate and the
Treasury Bill, where both gravitate around the Federal Funds target
rate. The change in the relative spread t, defined in Eq. 1,
between the Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds effective rate,
indicates changes in market speculation. c The relative spread
t, 15 days before and 15 days after the scheduled FOMC meeting
on December 14, 2004, which corresponds to t=0. Note that the
average value of the relative spread increases after the announce-
ment, indicating a shift in market consensus and speculation.
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period beginning in January 2000. The relative difference
between the 6 month Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds
effective rate is an indicator of the future expectations of the
Federal Funds target rate 18. Note that the 6 month Trea-
sury Bill has anticipatory behavior with respect to the Fed-
eral Funds target and hence effective rates. Other more so-
phisticated models utilize futures on Federal Funds and
Euro-Dollar exchange, but these markets are rather new and
represent the highly complex nature of contemporary mar-
kets and hedging programs 20–24. Hence, we use a simple
and intuitive method for estimating market speculation and
anticipation by analyzing the relative difference between the
6 month Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds effective rate.
Figure 1b exhibits the typical interplay between the 6
month Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds effective rate
before and after a FOMC meeting. The change in the value
of the effective rate results from market speculation, starting
approximately one trading week five trading days prior to
the announcement. This change follows from the forward-
looking Treasury Bill, which in the example in Fig. 1b, is
priced above the Federal Funds rate even 15 trading days
before the announcement.
In order to quantify speculation and anticipation in the
market prior to each scheduled FOMC meeting, we analyze
the time series t of the relative spread between Ft and
Tt,
t  lnFtTt 	 . 1
As an example of this relation, in Fig. 1c we plot t for
15 days before and after a typical FOMC meeting resulting
in a rate change. In order to study the speculation preceding
the ith scheduled FOMC meeting, we calculate the average
relative spread over the L1=15 day period. We weight the
days in the L1 day period leading up to the FOMC meeting
day exponentially, such that the relative spread on the tth
day before the announcement has the weight wt=e−t/.
Without loss of generality, we choose the value of 
=10 days corresponding to two trading weeks 25. We de-
fine the speculation metric,
i = ti 


t
ti − twt


t
wt
, 2
which is a weighted average of t before the announce-
ment, where the sums are computed over the range t
 1,L1. The metric i for the ith FOMC meeting can be
positive or negative, depending on the market’s forward-
looking expectations.
In order to quantify the market response to the speculation
i, we analyze the market volatility around each FOMC
meeting. For a particular stock around the ith scheduled
FOMC meeting, we take the daily high price phiti+t and
the daily low price plowti+t, for t −20,20, where
t=0 corresponds to ti, the day of the meeting. We then
compute the high-low range for each trading day,
rti + t  ln phiti + tplowti + t	 . 3
For each stock and each meeting, we scale the range by r,
the average range over the 41 day time sequence centered
around the meeting day, resulting in the normalized volatility
vti+trti+t / r. Similarly, we use ti+t, the
time series for the volume traded over the same period, to
compute a weight for each stock corresponding to the nor-
malized volume on the day of the FOMC meeting. We cal-
culate this weight as iti / i, where i is the aver-
age daily volume over the 41 day time sequence centered
around the ith meeting day. We use a volume weight in order
to emphasize the price impact resulting from relatively high
trading volume, since there are significant cross correlations
between volume and price changes 26. Finally, we compute
the weighted average volatility time series over all stocks
and all meetings,
vt 

 vti + ti

 i
. 4
In Fig. 2 we plot the trend of average daily volatility defined
in Eq. 4 for 10 days before and after the scheduled an-
nouncements.
We observe a peak in vt on FOMC meeting days,
corresponding to t=0, with a more pronounced peak in the
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FIG. 2. Color online Average daily volatility trend defined in
Eq. 4 exhibits increased market volatility on the day of FOMC
meetings, corresponding to t=0. “Bank” refers to the portfolio of
18 stocks that belong to the S&P 100. There is a 15–20 % increase
in volatility on days corresponding to FOMC meetings. Standard
deviation (vt)0.4 can be assigned to each data point in the
time series and is calculated by randomizing the daily volatility
time series of each company. Inset Probability density function
pdf of normalized volatility vrt / r, where the quantity rt
 lnphit / plowt is the range of the price time series of a given
stock for a particular day. We plot the pdf of volatility values for the
S&P 100 on the set of days with FOMC meetings and for the set of
all “other” days. The distributions are approximately logarithmic
normal, with a shift toward higher average volatility on FOMC
days. The average values for the two data sets are vFOMC=1.12
and vother=1.00.
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bank sector Fig. 2. Stocks in the bank sector are strongly
impacted by changes in Fed rates, which immediately influ-
ence both their holding and lending rates. On average there is
a 15–20 % increase in volatility on days corresponding to
FOMC meetings.
In order to quantify the impact of a single FOMC an-
nouncement on day ti, we define the average market volatil-
ity,
Vi = vti 


i
vtii


i
i
. 5
Here, ¯ i and 
i refer to the average and sum over
records corresponding only to the day ti. Again, i
ti /  is a normalized weight, where now  is the
average daily volume over the entire 8 year period, since we
compare many meetings across a large time span.
In Fig. 3 we plot the average volatility Vi of the S&P 100
Fig. 3a and the subset of 18 banking stocks Fig. 3b
versus i. For negative values of i, for which Tt	Ft
corresponding to an expected rate increase, we observe a less
volatile market response. Conversely, for larger positive val-
ues of i, for which Tt
Ft corresponding to a rate cut,
there tends to be larger market fluctuations. Hence, the mar-
ket responds differently to falling and rising rates, where the
direction in rate change often reflects the overall health of the
economy as viewed by the FOMC. Typically, the FOMC
implements rate increases to fight inflation, whereas rate de-
creases often follow bad economic news or economic emer-
gency. Hence, our findings are consistent with the empirical
sign effect, in which “bad” news has a greater impact in
markets than does “good” news 12. Furthermore, there is
also a tendency for large average volatility even when i is
small, possibly stemming from the extreme surprise charac-
teristic of some FOMC decisions. In these cases, more so-
phisticated methods are needed to improve the predictions of
market movement.
B. Intraday response to FOMC decision via an Omori law
In the previous section we studied the market response on
the daily scale. Now we ask the question “what is the intra-
day response to FOMC news?” Here, we analyze the TAQ
data over the 2 year period from January 1, 2001 to Decem-
ber 31, 2002. The reported times for the FOMC announce-
ment are listed in Table I 27. Inspired by the nonstationary
nature of financial time series, methods have been developed
within the framework of nonequilibrium statistical mechan-
ics to describe phenomena ranging from volatility clustering
28–30 to financial correlation matrices 31–33.
We use the Omori law, originally proposed in 1894 to
describe the relaxation of aftershocks following earthquakes,
to describe the response of the market to FOMC announce-
ments. Defined in Ref. 9, the Omori law quantifies the rate
nt of large volatility events following a singular perturba-
tion at time T. The shock may be exogenous resulting from
external news stimuli or endogenous resulting from internal
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FIG. 3. Color online Demonstration of the relation between
speculation of interest-rate change and market volatility in the S&P
100 and for the subset of banking stocks. We relate i, the specu-
lation in the market before a FOMC meeting defined in Eq. 2, to
the market volatility Vi defined in Eq. 5. A large absolute value of
i reflects the high probability that an interest-rate change will
happen. Interestingly, there are many instances where i0, fol-
lowed by large volatility. These values correspond to FOMC deci-
sions to maintain interest-rate levels R=0 and suggest a funda-
mental difference in the dynamics following decisions to change
versus decisions not change the Federal Funds target rate. Also,
there is an underlying symmetry in R since in the case of either a
rate increase or a rate decrease, the FOMC also has the option of no
increase. Hence, R=0 can occur as either good or bad news,
whereas typically decisions of R	0 reflect situations with posi-
tive market sentiment whereas decisions of R
0 reflect situations
with negative market sentiment. Hence, the asymmetry in market
volatility is consistent with the sign effect 12. Although the cor-
relation between i and Vi is dominated by residual error, it is
nevertheless supporting that the regression captures the crossover at
 ,V= 0,1. Including all data points, the regression correlation
coefficient is r2=0.34, and the slope of the regression is m
=0.360.13 for a, and r2=0.30 and m=0.540.22 for b. Re-
stricting data points corresponding only to interest-rate changes red
and green triangles: r2=0.48 and m=0.370.12 for a, and r2
=0.40 and m=0.530.21 for b this second regression is not
shown and is indistinguishable from the regression including all
data points. All linear regressions pass the ANOVA Analysis of
variance F test, rejecting the null hypothesis that m=0 at the 
=0.05 significance level.
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correlations, e.g., “herding effect” 34–38. This rate is de-
fined as
nt − T  t − T−, 6
where  is the Omori power-law exponent.
Here, we study the rate of events greater than a volatility
threshold q, using the high-frequency intraday price time se-
ries pt. The intraday volatility absolute returns is ex-
pressed as vtlnpt / pt−t, where we use t
=1 min. To compare stocks, we scale each raw time series in
terms of the standard deviation over the entire period ana-
lyzed, and then remove the average intraday trading pattern
as described in Ref. 10. This establishes a common volatil-
ity threshold q, in units of standard deviation, for all stocks
analyzed.
In the analysis that follows, we focus on Nt−T, the
cumulative number of events above threshold q,
Nt − T = 
T
t
nt − Tdt  t − T1−, 7
which is less noisy compared to nt−T. Using Nt−T,
we examine the intraday market dynamics for 100 S&P
stocks before t
T and after t	T the ith FOMC an-
nouncement at Ti, which typically occurs at 2:15 p.m. eastern
time ET 285 min after the opening bell for scheduled
meetings.
In Figs. 4a and 4b we plot the average volatility re-
sponse Nt of the S100 stocks analyzed, where
Nt 
1
S
j=1
S
Njt . 8
This average is obtained by combining the individual Omori
responses, Njt, of the S stocks. Such averaging does not
cancel the Omori law, but allows for better statistical regres-
sion. This is especially useful for an Omori law correspond-
ing to large volatility threshold q, where a single stock might
not have a sufficient number of events. In Fig. 4c we plot
the trade pattern Njt of Merrill Lynch MER on Tuesday
08/21/01, and also in Fig. 5 for the following 3 days, dem-
onstrating that the Omori relaxation can persists for several
days.
The abrupt change in the curvature of Nt illustrates the
volatility clustering which begins around the time of the an-
nouncement T, corresponding to the vertical line at t
=285 min in Figs. 4a–4c. For comparison, we find that
the average Nt time series calculated from all days with-
out FOMC meetings is approximately linear with time
throughout the entire day, indicating that the sudden increase
in excess volatility before and after announcement times T
results from the FOMC news. Volatility clustering in finan-
cial data sampled at the 1 min scale persists for several
months, with a significant crossover in the observed power-
law autocorrelations occurring around 600 min 1.5
days 39–41.
In order to compare the dynamics before and after the
announcement, we first separate the intraday time series Nt
into two time series Nbt  t
T and Nat  t	T. Then, to
treat the dynamics symmetrically around the ith intraday an-
nouncement time Ti 38,42, we define the displaced time 
= t−Ti1 as the temporal distance from the minute Ti 43.
As an illustration, we plot N in Fig. 6 for the four corre-
sponding Nt curves exhibited in Fig. 4a. We then employ
a linear fit to both Nb,i=NiTi−Nit−Ti and Na,i
=Nit−Ti−NiTi on a log-log scale to determine the Omori
power-law exponents b before the news and a after the
news. In analogy, we define the amplitude  before as b and
after as a, as defined in Eq. 7.
Typically a	0, which reflects the pronounced increase
in the rate of events above the volatility threshold q after the
time of the announcement. We also observe 
0, which
corresponds to a time series in which the preshocks or after-
shocks farther away from the announcement for large  are
dominant over the volatility cascade around time 0. For
comparison, n is constant for stochastic processes with no
memory, corresponding to 0. Hence, for an empirical
value 0, the rate n is indistinguishable from an expo-
nential decay for 
 t¯, where t¯ is the characteristic exponen-
tial time scale. However, for larger values of , the expo-
nential and power-law response curves are distinguishable,
especially if several orders of magnitude in  is available.
TABLE I. Reported times of market perturbations in the form of
FOMC news. Dates of 19 FOMC meetings in the 2 year period
between January 2001 and December 2002, where the Federal
Funds Target rate Rnew was implemented by the rate change R at T
minutes after the opening bell at 9:30 a.m. ET. The absolute relative
change R /RoldRt /Rt−1 has typically filled the range be-
tween 0.0 and 0.25. Note that date** refers to unscheduled meet-
ings, in which the announcement time did not correspond to 2:15
p.m. ET T=285 min 27.
FOMC date
Rnew
% R RRold T
01 /03 /01** 6 −0.5 −0.077 210
01/31/01 5.5 −0.5 −0.083 285
03/20/01 5 −0.5 −0.091 285
04 /18 /01** 4.5 −0.5 −0.100 90
05/15/01 4 −0.5 −0.111 285
06/27/01 3.75 −0.25 −0.063 285
08/21/01 3.5 −0.25 −0.067 285
09 /17 /01** 3 −0.5 −0.143 0
10/02/01 2.5 −0.5 −0.167 285
11/06/01 2 −0.5 −0.200 285
12/11/01 1.75 −0.25 −0.125 285
01/30/02 1.75 0 0.00 285
03/19/02 1.75 0 0.00 285
05/07/02 1.75 0 0.00 285
06/26/02 1.75 0 0.00 285
08/13/02 1.75 0 0.00 285
09/24/02 1.75 0 0.00 285
11/06/02 1.25 −0.5 −0.286 285
12/10/02 1.25 0 0.00 285
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For all meetings analyzed, we find that q in-
creases with q, meaning that the relatively large aftershocks
decay more quickly than the relatively small aftershocks.
Hence, the largest volatility values cluster around the an-
nouncement time T. For comparison, q values are calcu-
lated in 9 using q=4,5 ,6 ,7 and in 10 using q=3,4 for
large financial crashes. For our data set, the cumulative prob-
ability Pv	q that a given volatility value is greater than
volatility threshold q is Pv	3=0.18 and Pv	5=0.087.
Furthermore, we reject the null hypothesis that q	5 volatili-
ties are distributed evenly across all days, finding that 5% of
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FIG. 4. Color online The cumulative volatility time series Nt
demonstrates Omori-law response dynamics; here in response to
FOMC announcements occurring at the time T indicated by a ver-
tical solid red line. The abrupt change in the curvature of Nt
around time tT illustrates the increased volatility caused by the
announcement. The significant aftershocks which occur until the
end of the trading day are consistent with market under-reaction
11,12. Market under-reaction and other market inefficiencies can
result from increased levels of uncertainty among traders following
market news 13. Each time series Nt is calculated for a given
volatility threshold q, where larger q values correspond to Nt
curves with smaller amplitude smaller rate of large volatility
events. a–c illustrate the dynamics around a scheduled an-
nouncement made at T=285 min 2:15 p.m. ET. For the S&P 100,
we calculate Nt on 05/15/01 for a 1 min volatility and b 1 min
total volume using Eq. 8. c We calculate Njt for MER on
08/21/01. d The Omori law also occurs for unscheduled FOMC
announcements, as illustrated for the bank sector Nt on 04/18/01,
when the surprise rate change was announced at T=90 min 11:00
a.m. ET, resulting in raised levels of volatility throughout the en-
tire trading day. For a–d, the dashed red lines are power-law fits
beginning immediately after the announcement, with the corre-
sponding exponents aq appearing in parentheses within the
legends.
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FIG. 5. Color online The Omori-law relaxation can extend for
several days. We compare the Omori exponents aq indicated in
legends calculated for a the time series Na of the bank sector
and b the time series Na
j  of Merrill Lynch for 3 days 1275 min
after the announcement on Tuesday 08/21/01 at 2:15 p.m. 
=0 min corresponding to T=285 min. For the remaining 3 days
of the trading week, the Omori-law relaxation corresponding to an
individual stock MER is quantitatively similar to the Omori-law
relaxation of the bank sector over the final 105 min of the initial
trading day. We do not use the bank sector Na over the same
1275 min time period for comparison because “opening effects”
occurring during the first 60 min of each trading day make power-
law regression of conjoined Na problematic.
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FIG. 6. Color online An illustration of the method used to
calculate a Nb,i=NiTi−Nit−Ti and b Na,i=Nit−Ti
−NiTi for each intraday time series Nit. The displaced time 
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ment Ti. We plot the same data as in Fig. 4a, corresponding to the
announcement on 05/15/01 which occurred at T=285 min. c and
d show that Nb,i and Na,i are approximately linear on loga-
rithmic scale.
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the volatility values greater than q=5 are found on FOMC
meeting days, whereas only 4% are expected under the null
hypothesis that large volatilities are distributed uniformly
across all trading days. The 25% increase for q=5 indicates
that FOMC meetings days are more volatile than other days
at the 0 significance level. We also observe that the am-
plitudes of the Omori law generally obey the inequality b

a, resulting from the large response immediately follow-
ing the news.
Although we focus mainly on price volatility vt in this
paper, we also observe Omori dynamics in the high-
frequency volume time series t, defined as the cumulative
number of shares traded in minute t. In Figs. 7a–7d for
the S&P 100 and Figs. 7e–7h for the bank sector, we
compare the average of Omori exponents b and a for both
volatility and volume dynamics, and for volatility threshold
value q=3. We compute the average Omori exponents using
two averaging methods: the “individual” method and the
“portfolio” method.
To analyze the time series Na,i after the announcement i,
we first average the exponents a
j obtained for each indi-
vidual stock j, yielding a. This individual method pro-
vides an error bar corresponding to the sample standard de-
viation a. The second portfolio method determines a
single a from Nt in Eq. 8. Comparing the open-box
individual method and closed-box portfolio method sym-
bols in Fig. 7, we observe that both methods yield approxi-
mately the same average value of a. Note that for the subset
i= 1,4 ,8 of the unscheduled FOMC meetings, a is
smaller than usual, capturing the intense activity following
surprise announcements. Hence, unexpected FOMC an-
nouncements can produce an inverse Omori law exhibiting
convex relaxation a
0 over a short horizon if the news
contains a large amount of inherent surprise. The eight meet-
ing corresponds to the opening of the markets after Septem-
ber 11, 2001.
For the time series Nb,i before the announcement i, indi-
vidual stocks often do not have sufficient activity to provide
accurate power-law fits. Hence, to estimate the sample stan-
dard deviation b, we produce partial combinations,
Nb,i
1
M
 j=1
M Nb,i
j  using M5. We then compute a
standard deviation b from the b values calculated from
Nb,i. The b values correspond to the error bars for
b in Fig. 7.
We also compute a single b value from the portfolio
average Nb,i, which corresponds to the limit M =S. The
values of b using the two methods are consistent. Interest-
ingly, the values of b calculated from volume data are all
close to zero. However, using the student T test we reject the
null hypothesis that each average value b is equal to zero
at the =0.01 significance level for 15 out of 17 dates.
Figure 7 shows the range of  values for each of the 19
FOMC meetings we analyze. There are eight panels compar-
ing the  values i between the dynamics before and after T,
ii between the volatility and volume dynamics, and iii
between set of all stocks comprising the S&P 100 and the set
of stocks comprising the banking sector. We hypothesize that
the differences in the Omori  values, before and after the
announcement, are related to the anticipation and perceived
surprise of the FOMC news. Furthermore, for the dynamics
after the news, we find anomalous negative a values for
two surprise FOMC announcements i=1 and i=8. Also, we
find that volume  values are more regular across all meet-
ing events, suggesting that volume and price volatility con-
tain distinct market information 44,45.
In order to find potential variations in the response dy-
namics for different stock sectors, in Fig. 8a we compare
the a values after the announcement for five approximately
equal-sized sectors using volatility threshold q=3. We ob-
serve that the differences in the average values of the sectors
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FIG. 7. Color online Comparison of Omori-law exponents for
both volatility dynamics and volume dynamics on the day of 19
FOMC meetings during the 2 year period of January 2001–
December 2002. a–d correspond to the S&P 100 and e–h
correspond to the bank sector. The average value of  for the 16
scheduled FOMC meetings excluding the three unannounced meet-
ings i= 1,4 ,8 are a ¯ b=0.100.13, b ¯ a=0.240.08, c
¯ b=0.040.07, d ¯ a=0.240.07, e ¯ b=0.110.16, f ¯ a
=0.230.09, g ¯ b=0.010.10, and h ¯ a=0.260.08. The
similarity in exponents for 1 min volatility and 1 min cumulative
volume suggests a universal underlying mechanism. Solid symbols
 and  refer to  computed from Nt. Open symbols  and
 refer to  computed from S individual Omori exponents  j,
with Sbank=18. Note the relatively low values of a and a for
unscheduled FOMC announcements i=1 and 8, which indicates that
volatility rate following the announcement increased throughout the
day.
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are fairly small, indicating a broad market response. We also
observe that the technology sector, composed of hardware,
software, and information technology IT companies, often
has the largest average a value. Larger exponents, which
correspond to shorter relaxation times, could result from the
intense trading in the technology sector during the
technology/IT bubble, which peaked in the year 2000. In
follow-up analysis, we find in 46 that stocks with higher
trading activity, quantified as the average number of transac-
tions per minute, have larger  j in response to market shocks
and, thus, faster price discovery. In order to compare the
variation in the individual values of a
j
, we plot the prob-
ability density function pdf of exponents for all stocks and
meetings in Fig. 8b using the shifted variable xja,i
j
−a,i. We conclude from a Z test at the =0.0005 signifi-
cance level that technology sector Omori exponents are
larger on average, xTech	 xSP100.
Motivated by the metric i defined in Eq. 2, which
quantifies speculation and anticipation in the market preced-
ing FOMC meetings, we now develop a second metric to
describe surprise through the change in market speculation
following the announcement. This metric i compares the
anticipation leading up to the announcement with the revised
speculation following the FOMC decision. This can be quan-
tified through the relative change in t, which provides a
rough measure of the market stress that is released in the
financial shock. Qualitatively, i relates the average value of
the spread before and after the ith scheduled meeting. We
define
i  ti,a − ti,bSRi 9

 ti − twt
 wt − 
 ti + twt
 wt 	SRi ,
10
where the sum is computed over the range t 1,L2 trad-
ing days, with L2=15 trading days and 2=10 trading days.
The factor SRi=1 when the Fed increases or maintains
the target rate Rt, while SRi=−1 when the Fed de-
creases the target rate.
In Figs. 9a–9d we relate the amplitudes b and a,
and also the exponents b and b, to the speculation
metric  and the surprise metric . We observe that larger 
and larger  are related to larger amplitude b quantifying
the preshock dynamics. However, we do not find a statisti-
cally significant relation between  or  and the aftershock
parameters, suggesting that the relaxation dynamics follow-
ing FOMC news are less predictable. Nevertheless, the after-
shock dynamics are consistently more pronounced, with
a	 b. We interpret Figs. 9a and 9c as follows: when

0, corresponding to good market sentiment and possible
rate increase, the dynamics before the announcement have
small b and small b reflecting low activity. After the an-
nouncement, the values of a and a increase, corresponding
to a fast response of medium size. In the case of 	0,
corresponding to bad market sentiment resulting from specu-
lation of a rate cut, the dynamics before the announcement
have large b and large b, corresponding to a strong but
quick buildup of volatility. After the announcement, the dy-
namics have large a and small a, corresponding to a
strong and lasting relaxation dynamics. The interpretation of
Figs. 9b and 9d is similar to the interpretation of Figs.
9a and 9c, in that both surprise 	0 and expected 
0 bad news correspond to a stronger and longer-lasting
relaxation dynamics.
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FIG. 8. Color online a A comparison of a for five sectors
with volatility threshold q=3 suggests a broad universal market
response to FOMC news. The technology sector tends to have the
largest average a, where large  values correspond to faster re-
laxation. The horizontal straight line represents the mean ¯ a
=0.240.08, averaged over all stocks in the S&P 100 and all
scheduled meetings excluding the unscheduled meetings i
= 1,4 ,8. b Probability density function Px of the variable x
xa,i
j
=a,i
j
− a,i, which corresponds to individual a,i
j values
centered around the average exponent a,i of a given meeting i.
We conclude from a Z test at the =0.0005 significance level that
technology sector Omori exponents are larger on average, xTech
	 xSP100. Hence, since larger  values correspond to shorter re-
laxation time, we find that the technology sector stocks respond
more quickly to FOMC news, possibly as a result of relatively
intense trading activity among these stocks.
PETERSEN et al. PHYSICAL REVIEW E 81, 066121 2010
066121-8
IV. DISCUSSION
Information flows through various technological avenues,
keeping the ever-changing world up to date. All news carries
some degree of surprise, where the perceived magnitude of
the news certainly depends on the recipient. In financial mar-
kets, where speculation on investment returns results annu-
ally in billions of dollars in transactions, news plays a sig-
nificant role in perturbing the complex financial system both
on large and small scales, reminiscent of critical behavior
with divergent correlation lengths 47. Perturbations to the
financial system are easily transmitted throughout the market
by the long-range interactions that are found in the networks
of market correlations 31–33. Afterward, the effects of the
perturbation may persist via the long-term memory observed
in volatility time series 39–41, with fluctuation scaling
obeying the empirical Taylor’s law 48,49.
We have shown that the Omori law describes the dissipa-
tion of information following the arrival of Federal Open
Market Commission FOMC news. This type of relaxation
is consistent with the substructure of financial crash after-
shocks observed on various scales 10. In particular, we
systematically study the dynamical response of the stock
market to perturbative information in the form of a Federal
Reserve FOMC interest-rate announcements, which can be
expected scheduled or unexpected as in cases of emer-
gency.
In the case of unexpected news, as in Fig. 4d, a pro-
nounced response may result from reduced market liquidity
since traders do not have ample time to prepare and adjust
12. Our findings suggest that the dynamics of “rallies”
based on other forms of news, such as earning reports, up-
grades and downgrades of stocks by major financial firms,
unemployment reports, merging announcements, etc., might
also be governed by the Omori law with parameters that
depend on the type of news. The impact of macroeconomic
news has been analyzed for foreign exchange markets 12,
where it is found that high levels of volatility are present
following both scheduled and surprise news.
According to the efficient market hypothesis 14, the
time scale over which news is incorporated into prices
should be very small. However, consistent with previous
studies, we find market under-reaction 13 evident in the
finite time scale found here to be at least one trading day
over which the volatility aftershocks are significant. More-
over, we quantify the dynamics before and after and show
that the Omori parameters are related to investor sentiment
13, measured here by comparing the 6 month Treasury Bill
and the Federal Funds rates.
It is also conceivable that Omori-law decay of market
aftershocks also exists in the traded volume time series and
the bid-ask spread time series 42,50. Recently, Joulin et al.
36 used a similar method to describe the relaxation of trad-
ing following news streaming from feeds such as Dow Jones
and Reuters and compared to the relaxation following
anomalous volatility jumps. Joulin et al. 36 also found
Omori-law relaxation, with exponent a1 following a
news source and a0.5 following an endogenous jump;
interestingly, they found that the amplitude of the Omori law
is larger for news sources than for endogenous jumps. For
further comparison, Weber et al. 10 found a0.69 for the
38 days following the market crash on September 11, 1986.
One distinct difference between these studies is the source of
the news: Joulin et al. pooled together thousands of news
sources, some possibly pertaining to only a single stock; we
focus on one particular type of news, the FOMC target rate
decision, which has a broad impact on the whole market and
economy. It is possible that the difference between antici-
pated news and idiosyncratic news is the important criterion
to consider when analyzing market response functions in re-
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FIG. 9. Color online The relation between the size of the fi-
nancial shock, quantified by the S&P 100 volatility Omori-law pa-
rameters b, a, b, a, and = a− b, and the
size of the FOMC news, quantified through the metrics  repre-
senting market anticipation and  representing market surprise. All
trends are consistent with the hypothesis that a strong anticipation
of an interest-rate change, and the element of surprise inherent in
the FOMC decision, results in a market perturbation that is signifi-
cant in scale, and broad across the market. Linear regressions of a
and b S&P 100 data, and c and d bank sector data are provided
for visual aid. Linear regressions that pass the ANOVA F test re-
jecting null hypothesis that regression slope m=0 at the =0.05
significance level are solid green line; regressions that fail to pass
the F test at the =0.05 significance level are dashed red line.
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lation to exogenous events. Here, we find unique dynamics
before anticipated announcements.
In the case of FOMC news, speculation can be quantified
by measuring the relative difference between the effective
Federal Funds rate and the Treasury Bill in the weeks leading
up to a scheduled meeting. We develop a speculation metric
 and relate it to V, the volatility on the day of the meetings,
finding that the market behaves more erratically when the
Treasury Bill predicts a decrease in the Federal Funds target
rate. A rate decrease often occurs in response to economic
shocks, whereas a rate increase is often used to fight infla-
tion. Hence, the asymmetric response in Fig. 3 to rising and
falling rates is consistent with the sign effect, where it has
been found that bad news causes a larger market reaction
than good news 12, and that the asymmetry may result
from the increased uncertainty in expectations among trad-
ers.
We analyze the four Omori-law parameters b, a, b,
and a calculated for 19 FOMC meetings. We conjecture that
the Omori-law parameters are related to the market’s specu-
lation, anticipation, and surprise on the day of the FOMC
meeting. In order to quantify speculation of rate cuts and rate
increases, we define the measure , which is the relative
spread between the Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds
rates, before the meeting. In order to quantify surprise, we
develop , which measures the change in the relative spread
between the Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds rates, be-
fore and after the meeting. We relate both  and  to the
dynamical response of the market on the day of the meeting.
We find that relatively small  values and relatively large
amplitude  values, corresponding to longer relaxation time
and large response, follow from bad news, as in the case of
the market reaction to the World Trade Center attacks in
2001. All in all, these results show that markets relax accord-
ing to the Omori law following large crashes and Federal
interest-rate changes, suggesting that the perturbative re-
sponse of markets belongs to a universal class of Omori
laws, independent of the magnitude of news.
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